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I
INTRODUCTION
On Sunday, March 4, 2007, congregations in African American churches in
Selma, Alabama, commemorated the forty-second anniversary of "Bloody
Sunday," the 1965 Selma voting-rights march.' Celebrating with them were
Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama, both candidates in the
2008 presidential election. Despite federal regulations prohibiting § 501(c)(3)
nonprofit religious organizations from engaging in partisan political activities,
Senators Clinton and Obama each made a campaign stop at prominent African
American churches, delivering sermon-like speeches during Sunday services.
At Selma's First Baptist Church, Senator Clinton proclaimed that the
Voting Rights Act "giv[es] Senator Obama the chance to run for President of
the United States. And by its logic and spirit, it is giving the same chance to
Governor Bill Richardson, a Hispanic, and yes, it is giving me that chance,
too."
2
Meanwhile, in a colloquial speech at Brown Chapel AME Church, Senator
Barack Obama criticized the Department of Justice's civil-rights record: "[T]he
single most significant concern that this Justice Department under this
administration has had with respect to discrimination has to do with affirmative
action. That they have basically spent all their time worrying about colleges and
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universities around the country that are giv[ing] a little break to young African
Americans and Hispanics to make sure that they can go to college, too."3
Although it is unclear if either Senator's campaign stop violated the Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) prohibition against religious-nonprofit participation in
political activity, the March 4 speeches in Selma parallel alleged tax-code
violations from the 1998 and 2004 national elections. Most importantly, the
Selma speeches indicate that the regulations limiting political activity for
§ 501(c)(3) religious organizations will play an increasingly salient role in the
2008 presidential election. As churches and other nonprofit organizations test
the boundaries of permissible political behavior, the IRS will continue to push
back with organized enforcement mechanisms that may call into question, or at
worst revoke, the tax-exempt status upon which nonprofit organizations so
greatly depend.
Despite myriad criticisms, the IRS's enforcement of the prohibition against
church electioneering is desirable from both nonprofit-policy and normative
perspectives. Part I explains the history of tax-exempt organizations and the
prohibition on political campaign activity, highlighting the development of IRS
regulations and the constitutional paradigm under which tax-exempt
organizations operate. Part II explores the rise in church electioneering after
the pivotal Branch Ministries case, providing examples of alleged IRS Code
violations in the 1998 and 2004 national elections. Part III looks at the Political
Activities Compliance Initiative, an enforcement program that embodies the
IRS's response to the rise in violations, and the criticism it has received in its
original and revised forms. Part IV analyzes why the IRS's actions are desirable,
from both nonprofit-advocacy and normative perspectives. Finally, Part V looks
toward the 2008 presidential election and concludes that, if improved, the IRS's
revised enforcement procedure may be the only comprehensive and
constitutional means of mitigating impermissible church electioneering in the
2008 campaign.
II
§ 501(c)(3) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY
A. Historical Perspective
In 1917, Congress enacted legislation codifying the first charitable income-
tax deduction.' Congress created the exemption to combat fears that the bill
that raised federal tax rates to help finance World War I would deter private
3. Senator Barack Obama, Speech: Selma Voting Rights March Commemoration (Mar. 4. 2007),
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/03/04/selma-voting-rights-marchcomm.php (last visited Mar. 24,
2008).
4. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 874 (3d ed. 2006).
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donations to charitable organizations, schools, hospitals, and churches Implicit
in this reasoning was the belief that private donations to charitable
organizations were most often given from an individual's "surplus" income,6
which would have been reduced steeply by the 1917 federal tax increase.
Characterized as § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations under the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC), churches7 benefit immensely from the charitable tax
deduction. Contributions to churches, like donations to other § 501(c)(3)
nonreligious charitable organizations, can be deducted from a donor's taxable
income.' In addition, churches are exempt from income and property taxes, and
they have special access to tax-exempt bonds and benefits such as preferred
postal rates.'
To receive and maintain tax-exempt status, churches, like other charitable
organizations, must be "organized and operated exclusively for religious [or]
charitable.., purposes" that produce public benefit. Moreover, the IRC
prohibits § 501(c)(3) organizations' net earnings from "inuring to the benefit of
any private ... individual" and requires that "no substantial part" of a
§ 501(c)(3)'s activities consist of attempts to influence legislation (lobbying)."
In 1954, then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson proposed, and Congress enacted,
a legislative amendment prohibiting § 501(c)(3) organizations from
participating in political activity. 2 At present, § 501(c)(3) organizations are
"absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening
in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Here, the term "church" will be used according to IRS guidelines, which "use ['church'] in its
generic sense as a place of worship including, for example, mosques and synagogues." INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: BENEFITS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL TAX LAW 2 (2006). In contrast, "religious organization"
does not refer to churches, but rather to "nondenominational ministries, interdenominational and
ecumenical organizations, and other entities whose principal purpose is the study or advancement of
religion." Id.
8. John G. Simon, Harvey P. Dale & Laura B. Chisholm, The Tax Treatment of Charitable
Organizations, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 4, at 322-25. IRC § 170(c) allows taxpayers
to deduct from their taxable income donations made to § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, so long as
those organizations comply with the restrictions promulgated in § 501(c), including the prohibition
against intervening on behalf of, or in opposition to, political campaigns. See Branch Ministries v.
Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
9. Simon, Dale & Chisholm, supra note 8, at 322-25.
10. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 327.
11. Id. Churches meeting IRC § 501(c)(3) requirements are automatically deemed tax exempt;
unlike other charitable organizations, churches are not required to apply to the IRS for tax-exempt
status. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 7, at 3.
12. Internal Revenue Service, Charities, Churches and Politics, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=161131,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). Senator Johnson's motivation for banning
charitable organizations' participation in political activity is a subject of debate among scholars. Many
argue that Johnson offered the amendment to prevent a political opponent from receiving campaign
contributions from charitable organizations. See Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches, and the IRS:
Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
145, 152-53 (2006).
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elective public office."" Violation of the prohibition on political activity can
result in punishment, including the revocation of tax-exempt status
(consequently threatening donors' ability to deduct contributions),'4 IRS
warnings, or imposition of an excise tax of up to ten percent on political
expenditures. 5
B. Prohibition on Electioneering
The prohibition on church participation in political activity, often dubbed
"electioneering," extends to all facets of political engagement. The regulation
prohibits religious leaders from "making partisan comments in official
organization publications or at official church functions,"'6 limits churches'
abilities to invite political candidates as event speakers, 7 and prohibits church
creation and distribution of voter guides as a covert means of favoring or
opposing certain candidates. 8 A church minister, for example, may not endorse
(or oppose) a political candidate from the pulpit during a worship service. She
may, however, endorse a particular candidate at a press conference at the
candidate's headquarters if she clearly conveys that she does not represent or
speak on behalf of the church. 9
Similarly, a church may invite political candidates to official events without
jeopardizing tax-exempt status if it invites all candidates seeking the same
office, refrains from endorsing or opposing a candidate, and abstains from
political fundraising at the event." A church may, for example, sponsor an
educational voter forum. To determine the propriety of such an event, the IRS
would look to factors such as discussion of a wide range of issues relevant to the
elected office, equal time for each participant, and avoidance of "litmus test"-
type questions for the candidates.2' Political candidates may also be invited to
church events as noncandidates; this most often occurs when a candidate is
already an elected official, celebrity, or other public figure. In such cases, the
church is not required to provide equal access and opportunity to others, but
neither the speaker nor the church officials may in any way discuss the
speaker's candidacy.22
13. Internal Revenue Service, Political Campaign Activity, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/
article/0,,id=163395,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). In 1987, Congress amended the language
prohibiting political activity to "clarify that the prohibition also applies to statements opposing
candidates." Id.
14. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 7, at 11.
15. Id. at 7; see also id. at 11.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id. at 10. In 2004, the IRS made concerted efforts to clarify the prohibition on electioneering,
which was for many years ambiguous to the extent that churches were unsure of exactly in which
activities they could and could not engage. See discussion of IRS activities infra Part III.
19. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 7, at 8.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 8-9.
22. See id. at 9.
[Vol. 71:185
FROM BRANCH MINISTRIES TO SELMA
The prohibition on electioneering does not categorically preclude churches
from producing and distributing educational voter guides during election
season. But because some churches have used voter guides implicitly to support
candidates, the IRS has advised that a voter guide is more likely to violate§ 501(c)(3) regulations if it compares a candidate's policy position to that of the
organization, if it does not include all candidates for the same office, or if the
description of a candidate's position is biased.' Conversely, voter guides are less
likely to jeopardize a church's tax-exempt status when they include all
candidates and when they allow those candidates to describe their positions in
their own words and to discuss a broad range of relevant issues."
Although the prohibition on electioneering necessarily precludes church
participation in partisan activities, it does not, as many critics suggest, limit
discussion of important policy issues. Church leaders can avoid institutional
repercussions by clearly signaling comments made in an individual capacity and
by restricting personal comments to nonofficial events and publications.'
Indeed, IRS literature asserts that the prohibition on political activity "is not
intended to restrict free expression on political matters by leaders of churches
or religious organizations speaking for themselves, as individuals."26 Moreover,
religious leaders may discuss important policy matters during official services as
long the discussion does not endorse or oppose a particular candidate. Churches
may also engage in a wide array of voter-education activities, such as candidate
forums and voter-guide production, which comprehensively explain candidates'
policy positions. Churches may even facilitate policy debates through candidate
forums, so long as they do not circumvent regulations that prohibit favoring or
opposing candidates.
C. Constitutional Paradigm: Branch Ministries v. Rossotti
Courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)'s
prohibition on electioneering and the IRS's statutory authority to enforce it.27 In
so doing, courts have endorsed the idea that taxpayer dollars should not be used
to subsidize-through a church's exemption from income and property taxes
and receipt of other federal tax breaks-other citizens' public-policy and
political preferences.28 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit explained in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, the "Supreme
23. Id. at 10.
24. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 7, at 10.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
27. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Christian Echoes
Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972) ("We hold that the
limitations imposed by Congress in Section 501(c)(3) are constitutionally valid.").
28. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc., 470 F.2d at 854 ("The limitations in Section 501(c)(3)
stem from the Congressional policy that the United States Treasury should be neutral in political affairs
and that substantial activities directed to attempts to influence legislation or affect a political campaign
should not be subsidized.").
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Court has consistently held that, absent invidious discrimination, 'Congress has
not violated [an organization's] First Amendment rights by declining to
subsidize its First Amendment activities. '
Moreover, abiding by § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on political activity in
exchange for organizational tax exemption does not infringe a church's right to
free exercise of religion. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia characterized this tradeoff in Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti:
"Plaintiffs were offered a choice: they could engage in partisan political activity
and forfeit their Section 501(c)(3) status or they could refrain from partisan
political activity and retain their Section 501(c)(3) status. That choice is
unconnected to plaintiffs' ability to freely exercise their religion., 3' Branch
Ministries, in which the IRS "for the first time in its history ... revoked a bona
fide church's tax-exempt status because of its involvement in politics,"31 has
subsequently become the paradigm for modern constitutional analysis of
§ 501(c)(3) electioneering cases.
In that case, a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, Branch Ministries, Inc.,32
financed full-page advertisements in the Washington Times and USA Today
opposing Bill Clinton's 1992 candidacy for President.3 The advertisements,
published four days before the 1992 presidential election, announced:
"Christian Beware. Do not put the economy ahead of the Ten
Commandments."34 They continued, citing biblical passages and proclaiming
that "Bill Clinton is promoting policies that are in rebellion to God's laws ....
How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?"3 Significantly, the advertisement
included the following notice: "This advertisement was co-sponsored by The
Church at Pierce Creek, Daniel J. Little, Senior Pastor, and by churches and
concerned Christians nationwide. Tax-deductible donations for this
advertisement gladly accepted." 6 The notice, displayed in fine print at the
bottom of the advertisement, also provided a mailing address for donations."
In response, the IRS initiated a Church Tax Inquiry pursuant to IRC
§ 7611." On January 15, 1995, after a multi-year investigation into the church's
political activities-and those of its nonprofit parent, Branch Ministries-the
IRS revoked Branch Ministries' § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, retroactive to
January 1, 1992." Specifically, the IRS alleged that by placing, in its official
29. 211 F.3d at 143-44 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540, 552-53 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
30. Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 1999).
31. 211 F.3d at 139.
32. Branch Ministries operated as the Church at Pierce Creek in Binghamton, New York. See Amy
Keller, Bill Would Allow Clergy to Mix Religion and Politics, ROLL CALL, Aug. 8, 2002.
33. See Branch Ministries, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d at 15-18.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See discussion of § 7611, infra note 78.
39. Branch Ministries, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18.
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capacity, a political advertisement in two national newspapers and by soliciting
funds to finance those advertisements, the church "undertook partisan political
activity in direct violation of [§] 501(c)(3).""
Branch Ministries challenged the IRS's ruling, asserting that revocation of
the church's tax-exempt status infringed its right to free exercise of religion
pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)."' The D.C. District Court rejected Branch Ministries' argument since
the church did not claim that "withdrawal from electoral politics would violate
its beliefs," thus substantially burdening its free exercise of religion. 2 Instead,
the court found that "the sole effect of the loss of the tax exemption will be to
decrease the amount of money available to the Church for its religious
practices,"43 since losing its § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status would prevent the
church from providing tax deductions to charitable donors under IRC § 170(c).
Refuting Branch Ministries' free-exercise claim, the D.C. District Court
offered two illustrations of substantial burdens on religion that would not pass
constitutional muster: cases "where the government 'put[s] substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,' or where the
government forces an individual to 'choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion."'" Because Branch Ministries could follow its religious
beliefs and receive § 501(c)(3) tax benefits by refraining from intervention in
favor of, or in opposition to, political candidates, the D.C. District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS." One year later, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed that decision, holding that "the revocation of the Church's tax-
exempt status neither violated the Constitution nor exceeded the IRS's
statutory authority.
46
III
THE RISE IN CHURCH ELECTIONEERING POST-BRANCH MINISTRIES
Although Branch Ministries' tax-exempt status was revoked in 1995 for an
action that took place in 1992, the litigation surrounding the IRS's decision
extended through 1999. Yet even after media coverage of this highly visible
case-which represented the IRS's first revocation of a church's tax-exempt
status because of church electioneering 47-§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt churches
continued to engage in prohibited political activity.
40. Id. at 20.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; Branch Ministries, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
42. Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
43. Id.
44. Branch Ministries, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
45. Branch Ministries, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
46. Branch Ministries, Inc., 211 F.3d at 145.
47. See id. at 139.
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In 1998, the Clinton Administration Department of Justice, together with
the IRS, began enforcing the prohibition of tax-exempt religious organizations'
participation in "partisan political activity."' Ironically, three days after the
Clinton Department of Justice argued the Branch Ministries case in the D.C.
Circuit, and only two days before the 1998 midterm elections, President Clinton
visited Baltimore's New Psalmist Baptist Church.49 Speaking to the Church
during a televised worship service, President Clinton introduced Democratic
state and national political candidates, all of whom were in attendance, and
exhorted the congregation to elect more Democrats to Congress." Employing
partisan rhetoric, President Clinton juxtaposed New Psalmist's congregation
against others who would vote in the upcoming midterm election, saying that
"all over America today there are people in other churches who have a
different view[,] [w]ho believe that their principles require them to vote only for
people at the extreme right wing of the Republican Party.""1 The President
extolled his position as the "alternative"; he had "done everything [he] could to
bring this country together, to reconcile the American people to one another so
we could go forward together." 2
Although New Psalmist Baptist Church could have invited President
Clinton to speak in his capacity as a public official, President Clinton's partisan
rhetoric encouraging reelection of Democratic candidates almost certainly
violated § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on electioneering. Yet even if the church's
advocacy, via President Clinton's speech, did not contravene § 501(c)(3), other
elements of the President's visit patently violated the code. Most notably,
Congressman Elijah Cummings, who represented the district where the church
was located, had arranged President Clinton's visit and secured its funding by
soliciting $1,000 political contributions from supporters. 3 In exchange, the
financial backers were invited to a "meet and greet" session and photographic
opportunity with President Clinton after the service.5 ' Even more indicative of
the church's impropriety was that the White House could not use federal tax
dollars to finance the event because it was deemed inherently political.
It is unclear whether the IRS initiated an investigation into the New
Psalmist Baptist Church's political activities, despite similarities to the Branch
Ministries case. That the New Psalmist's activities included patent § 501(c)(3)
violations, such as fundraising at an official church function, 6 renders the
48. Randy Lee, When God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the
Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391, 391 (2000).
49. See id. at 395.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 395-96.
53. See Lee, supra note 48, at 396.
54. See id.
55. Id. It is interesting that, although the White House knew about Representative Cummings'
fundraising plan in advance, the church did not. Id.
56. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, infra note 75, at 17 (deeming § 501(c)(3) organizations'
contributions to candidates a "type of political intervention ... easy to document").
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Clinton Justice Department's prosecution in the Branch Ministries ironic and
perhaps hypocritical.
Yet President Clinton's visit to New Psalmist Church was not the only
instance of churches jeopardizing their tax-exempt status through seemingly
political activities. Also in 1998, President Clinton appeared with Senator
Chuck Schumer in New York City's Saint Sebastian's Church Parish Center.57
Schumer's staff deemed the appearance a "campaign stop"5"-a definition that
would appear inherently political to most observers. Similarly, in 1998 Vice
President Al Gore appeared with Representative Dennis Kucinich and
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Lee Fisher at Mount Sinai Baptist Church
in Cleveland, Ohio." During the visit, Vice President Gore urged the crowd,
"[I]t's so important that you elect Lee Fisher as your next governor!"'
Representative Kucinich responded, "Governor Lee Fisher. Say Amen! ... The
Democratic ticket. Say Amen!"6' Like Representative Cummings' unabashedly
political fundraiser at New Psalmist Church, Vice President Gore's and
Representative Kucinich's forthright advocacy in favor of a gubernatorial
candidate appears to egregiously violate § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on
electioneering.
Church participation in electioneering has not, however, been limited to
congregations supporting Democratic political candidates. By 2004, a
presidential election year, the IRS saw a marked increase in complaints alleging
church electioneering. 2 Investigations of more than one hundred complaints
after the 2004 election yielded a "'disturbing' amount of illegal politicking in
churches and charities.61 3 Two prominent examples stem from complaints filed
against World Harvest Church and Fairfield Christian Church in Columbus,
Ohio-a major battleground state for President Bush in the 2004 presidential
election.' Both churches were accused of intervening on behalf of J. Kenneth
Blackwell, the Republican candidate for Secretary of State. One complaint
alleged that the churches engaged in electioneering by allowing Blackwell to
appear at official church events more than two dozen times, while other
candidates were not invited or did not attend.66 Another alleged that World
Harvest Church promoted Blackwell's candidacy by improperly allowing use of
57. Lee, supra note 48, at 397.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Patrice Hill, Church Politicking 'Disturbing' to IRS, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at Al.
63. Id.; see also discussion of 2004 PACI report infra Part III.
64. See Peter Slevin, Ohio Churches' Political Activities Challenged: Clergy Members Are Pressing
the IRS to Investigate Whether Partisan Support Violated Tax-Exempt Status, WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
2006, at A3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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church facilities-specifically by permitting Blackwell to use the church's
private plane for three separate trips to events opposing same-sex marriage.67
At the other end of the political spectrum, All Saints Church in Pasadena,
California, provoked great consternation when its Rector Emeritus vehemently
criticized President Bush in a sermon only days before the 2004 presidential
election.' In a sermon titled "If Jesus Debated Senator Kerry and President
Bush," Reverend Dr. George F. Regas posited,
Jesus continues: "Mr. President, your doctrine of preemptive war is a failed doctrine.
Forcibly changing the regime of an enemy that posed no imminent threat has led to
disaster." . . . Jesus turns to President Bush again with deep sadness. "Is what I hear
really true? Do you really mean that you want to end a decade-old ban on developing
nuclear battlefield weapons, as well as endorsing the creation of a nuclear 'bunker-
blaster' bomb? Are you really going to resume nuclear testing? That is sheer
insanity."... Everything I know about Jesus would have him uttering those words. 69
Six months after the 2004 presidential election, the IRS initiated a Church Tax
Inquiry into All Saints' activities as part of what would become a much larger
enforcement initiative.7"
IV
A FEDERAL RESPONSE: THE IRS PUSHES BACK
A. 2004 Political Activities Compliance Initiative
Despite prominent examples of churches violating the prohibition against
political activity in the 1998 and 2004 elections, the IRS did not heighten its
examination of alleged violations until June 2004,71 less than five months before
the 2004 presidential election. To that end, the IRS implemented a two-pronged
approach to alleviate the problem of church electioneering. First, it initiated an
educational campaign, using press releases, workshops, forums, and speeches to
remind churches of the prohibition.72 Through these communications, the IRS
67. Id. As of April 2006, the IRS was unable to confirm or deny that it had initiated an
investigation based on these complaints. Id.
68. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 546.
69. Reverend Dr. George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, Sermon at All Saints Church, Pasadena, Cal.
(Oct. 31, 2004), available at http://www.allsaints-pas.org/sermons/(10-31-04) %201f%20Jesus%20
Debated.pdf.
70. See Stephanie Strom, Group Seeks I.R.S. Inquiry of 2 Ohio Churches Accused of Improper
Campaigning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at A9, in FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 548.
71. IRS enforcement of the prohibition on § 501(c)(3) political activity was markedly more lenient
before the Branch Ministries case in 1992. There was, consequently, a stark contrast between the reality
of churches' political involvement (and alleged violations) and the strict statutory prohibition of such
activities. See Jerome P. Prather, Note: Tax Exemption of American Churches and Other Nonprofits:
One Election Cycle After Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 94 KY. L.J. 139, 142 (2005-2006); Lee, supra
note 48, at 392.
72. Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner, Remarks at the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 24,
2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=154788,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
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reached out to churches and other nonprofit organizations to explain and clarify
the consequences of violating the ban on political activity."
Second, the IRS created a "dedicated enforcement program,"74 the Political
Activities Compliance Initiative (PACI), to "promote compliance with the IRC
§ 501(c)(3) prohibition against political campaign intervention,"" and to quickly
identify and remedy "credible allegations of wrongdoing." 6 The PACI was also
created to examine potential § 501(c)(3) violations "during-not after-the
election cycle"7 in order to decrease prohibited activities in the course of the
election season. Importantly, the PACI was charged with evaluating allegations
for all § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, which include both religious and
secular nonprofit organizations. Accordingly, the PACI reviewed allegations of
church electioneering pursuant to IRC § 7611, which regulates how the IRS
"may conduct civil tax inquiries and [the] examination of churches.'"7
The IRS's 2004 PACI report presents a compelling snapshot of § 501(c)(3)
organizations' compliance with the prohibition against intervention in political
campaigns. Of 110 total cases reviewed by the IRS, sixty-three (representing
fifty-seven percent) involved nonchurches, while forty-seven (representing
forty-three percent) involved churches.7 9 By February 26, 2006, the most recent
update on the 2004 PACI, "[n]early three-quarters of the [82] examinations
completed to date.., concluded that the tax-exempt organizations, including
churches, engaged in some type of prohibited political activity."' Of the eighty-
two cases closed, forty churches and forty-two nonchurches81 engaged in a range
of prohibited activities that included distributing printed materials (such as
church bulletins or inappropriate voter guides),82 endorsing a candidate,
endorsing candidates on the organization's website, placing election signs on the
organization's property, conferring preferential treatment upon a candidate
invited to speak at the organization's event, making monetary donations to
political campaigns, and permitting religious leaders to endorse or oppose a
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final-paci-report.pdf
(detailing the results of the 2004 PACI).
76. Everson, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 7, at 22. Through § 7611, Congress limits IRS
church-related tax inquiries to cases in which "the Director, Exempt Organizations, Examinations
reasonably believes, based on a written statement of the facts and circumstances, that the organization:
(a) may not qualify for the exemption; or (b) may not be paying tax on an unrelated business or other
taxable activity." Id.
79. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 8.
80. Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Service Releases New Guidance
and Results of Political Intervention Examinations (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom!
article/0,,id=154780,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
81. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 18.
82. Id. at 16.
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candidate from the pulpit.83 Although these activities were not carried out
exclusively by churches, each category of offense was committed by at least one
church.8'
As a result of the 2004 investigation, eighty-four percent of church case
examinations ended with the IRS issuing advisories85 indicating that the
organization impermissibly intervened in a political campaign, but that it was
"of a one-time, nonrecurring nature[,] ... was taken in good faith reliance on
advice of counsel,.., was otherwise shown to be an anomaly," or that the
organization corrected the violation "and established that it had taken steps to
prevent any future political intervention."' Only eight percent of the church
cases resulted in "no change," 7 a determination that the organization did not
violate the conditions of § 501(c)(3)."
The IRS made several significant findings through the PACI. First, although
many of the allegations yielded evidence of wrongdoing, the 2004 PACI Report
points out that there are "over one million [§] 501(c)(3) organizations" and that
"media reports on the activities of a small representation of those organizations
can, rightly or wrongly, create an impression of widespread noncompliance."'
So although it is true that the IRS can justify undertaking increased measures to
identify and remedy church electioneering, it is also true that the media may
disproportionately emphasize stories about the relatively small sphere of
offenders.
Second, the IRS identified ambiguity in the IRC language instructing that
§ 501(c)(3) nonprofits "not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or
in opposition to) any candidate for public office."9 Because textual confusion
led many organizations-especially churches-to interpret the prohibition as
"limited to expressly endorsing or opposing candidates," many religious leaders
"made a conscious effort to avoid an express endorsement, yet made an indirect
endorsement clearly conveying a message on behalf of, or in opposition to, a
candidate."91 Consequently, churches may not have realized that implicit
political interventions, such as preferential treatment to political candidates at
official church functions, violate the statute in the same way a verbal
endorsement from the pulpit would.
83. Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, supra note 80.
84. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 15-18.
85. Id. at 21.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 18. Notably, a "no change" finding does not signify a total lack of culpability. Many
allegations of nonprofit political intervention that ultimately resulted in a "no change" finding
"appeared to be actions of the organization, but.., were shown, upon examination, to be attributable
to someone other than the organization." Id. at 22.
89. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 2.
90. Id. at 21.
91. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
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B. 2006 Revision and Application
It was in this context-a combination of newfangled enforcement and
confusion-that the IRS decided to revise the PACI. In a February 2006
speech, then-IRS Commissioner Mark Everson unveiled revised examination
procedures-based on best practices from the 2004 PACI-for the 2006
election cycle.' In his speech, Everson proposed improvements for the 2006
PACI: use information gleaned from the 2004 election cycle to educate and
inform churches leading up to the 2006 midterms, begin enforcement
procedures earlier in the election cycle, publicize enforcement efforts, and
expand human capital so more teams can be trained to identify and examine
alleged violations. 3
By unveiling procedures for the 2006 PACI in February-more than eight
months before the November midterm election-the IRS put churches and
other § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations on notice of the agency's intention to
continue enforcing the ban on electioneering. Moreover, introducing revised
procedures in February allowed the IRS to educate organizations before the
most intense campaign months preceding the November election. One
nonprofit director remarked, "They're getting information out early this year,
before we get into the heat of an election year. By releasing data on the
findings, they're moving toward more transparency."9
In fact, the IRS's modified PACI did increase transparency. By issuing
reports and other educational materials, such as fact sheets,95 the IRS clarified
§ 501(c)(3) by illustrating categories of prohibited activities and by providing
examples of activities that would and would not be acceptable under the Code.
For example, the IRS's Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations,
revised in September 2006, explains the policy regarding churches' inviting
political candidates to speak at official functions, then provides two
hypothetical scenarios. In the first example,
Minister E invited the three Congressional candidates for the district in which Church
N is located to address the congregation, one each on three successive Sundays, as part
of regular worship services. Each candidate was given an equal opportunity to address
and field questions on a wide variety of topics from the congregation. Minister E's
92. See IRS Releases New Guidance, Results of Political Intervention Examinations, US FED NEWS,
Feb. 24, 2006 ("As the 2006 electoral season approaches, we are going to provide more and better
guidance and move quickly to address prohibited activities.") (quoting IRS Commissioner Mark
Everson). Everson also provided the context for the IRS's increased vigilance over churches violating
the prohibition on political intervention: one of the IRS's stated objectives for the years 2005-2009 is
"deter[ring] abuse within tax-exempt and governmental entities and misuse of such entities by third
parties for tax avoidance and other unintended purposes." Everson, supra note 72.
93. Everson, supra note 72.
94. Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Finds Sharp Increase in Illegal Political Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2006, at A8 (quoting Liz Towne, director of advocacy programs for the Alliance for Justice).
95. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Election Year Activities and the Prohibition on Political
Campaign Intervention for Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=154712,00.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
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introduction of each candidate included no comments on their qualifications or any
indication of a preference for any candidate."
According to the report, Church N's actions are permissible and do not
constitute political campaign intervention.97 The report provides a second
example to illustrate impermissible activity:
Minister F is the minister of Church 0. The Sunday before the November election,
Minister F invited Senate Candidate X to preach to her congregation during worship
services. During his remarks, Candidate X stated, "I am asking not only for your
votes, but for your enthusiasm and dedication, for your willingness to go the extra mile
to get a very large turnout on Tuesday." Minister F invited no other candidate to
address her congregation during the Senatorial campaign. Because these activities
took place during official church services, they are attributed to Church 0. By
selectively providing church facilities to allow Candidate X to speak in support of his
campaign, Church O's actions constitute political campaign intervention.
98
In addition to these two examples, the report offers pairs of contrasting
illustrations for individual activity by religious leaders, candidate forums, public
officials' speaking as noncandidates, and publishing voter guides.'
C. Criticisms and Responses
Despite efforts to increase transparency and understanding through the
2006 PACI, the IRS still faces critics who object to the agency's enforcement
activities on both substantive and procedural grounds. Substantively, Congress's
prohibition on church electioneering provokes criticism that limiting speech in
churches infringes on parishioners' First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and free exercise of religion."°
These critics, however, contravene well-established precedent"' and
discount § 501(c)(3)'s policy implications. Although it is true that churches may
not directly or indirectly intervene in political campaigns, they may still discuss
important social-justice and public-policy issues. °2 Critics of the IRS regulations
make a false distinction: neither Congress nor the courts have proscribed
religious Americans from participating in public-policy debates; instead, they
have only prohibited political activities under official church leadership, on
state-subsidized land, with clergy whose salaries are indirectly subsidized by
federal tax dollars.
96. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 7, at 9.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 7-10.
100. See Lee, supra note 48, at 393 ("[W]hen the state forecloses churches from attempting to serve
as a conscience to power, the state violates the Establishment Clause, because one of the real values of
the Establishment Clause is guaranteeing that churches in America retain an unrestricted voice worthy
of listening to."). See also discussion of Branch Ministries, supra Part I.
101. See discussion of the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)'s limitations, supra Part I.
102. See Stephanie Innes, Churches Must Toe IRS Line During Elections, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Oct.
29, 2006, at Al (providing examples of the broad range of permissible activities, including handing out
voting guides and hosting candidate forums).
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On a substantive level, critics also allege that to enforce § 501(c)(3), the IRS
must examine the content of churches' speech, thus threatening First
Amendment protections. 3  Such criticism is, however, misplaced. IRS
documents categorically forbid examiners from reviewing religious content in
the course of tax evaluation:
The courts have interpreted the First Amendment as providing for an absolute
freedom of religious belief. Thus, IRS personnel engaged in church tax inquiries or
examinations may not question or evaluate the content of a religious belief. However,
actions undertaken as a result of religious beliefs are subject to government
regulation, including taxation, when such actions implicate a compelling government
interest.""'
In addition to substantive constitutional concerns, many critics are
apprehensive of the IRS's procedures for enforcing § 501(c)(3). Naysayers
complain that ascertaining political intervention is a precarious task.
Admittedly, "the Code contains no bright line test for evaluating political
intervention."' 5 Even so, there is a bright-line rule in many cases of alleged
electioneering. Some actions, when undertaken by a church, clearly violate the
IRC. Candidate endorsements, candidate opposition, voter guides that
obviously favor one candidate over another, and campaign contributions to a
candidate clearly defy the conditions for maintaining tax-exempt status. 6 That
one side of the bright line-the permissibility of a church's website content,
educational voter guides, or candidate forums° -is more difficult to discern
does not signify the total absence of boundaries. Surely, a carefully organized
education and enforcement program is preferable to a total lack of IRS
enforcement.
Opponents of the IRS's enforcement methods also allege that the agency
selectively enforces the ban on electioneering by relying on the opinions of IRS
political appointees." s This, too, is misunderstood: IRS career civil servants-
not political appointees-manage and investigate complaints filed with the
PACI.l° In fact, following the 2004 investigation into political remarks made by
103. Prather, supra note 71, at 156.
104. IRS, Section 7: Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations-IRC § 7611, http://www.irs.gov/
irm/part4/ch53s07.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2008). See also id. ("[IRS] examination of churches ... [is]
subject to special procedures because of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the restrictions imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). In carrying out
the IRS's obligation to enforce the tax laws applicable to churches and organizations claiming to be
churches, IRS personnel must be aware of the sensitive nature of the church-state relationship and
observe the restrictions on examinations of churches.").
105. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 1.
106. See Jocelyne Miller & Harvey Berger, Problems at the Polls: It's Nearly Election Time-Are
You Ready?, NON-PROFIT TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at 3. See also Prather, supra note 71, at 156
("Admittedly, overtly partisan political activity is somewhat easier to identify and categorize than issue-
related activity.").
107. See Miller & Berger, supra note 106, at 3.
108. Prather, supra note 71, at 156.
109. See IRS Releases New Guidance, Results of Political Intervention Examinations, supra note 92
("To ensure fairness and impartiality, the issues examined stretched across the political spectrum.
Further, IRS career civil servants handled the cases without regard to political affiliation.").
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Chairman Julian Bond of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) (a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, albeit not a
religious one), then-IRS Commissioner Mark Everson requested an
examination into allegations that the IRS initiated the investigation for political
reasons. ' In the NAACP case, Bond allegedly "distribut[ed] statements in
opposition of George W. Bush for the presidency..".. Upon concluding the
investigation, which cleared the NAACP of wrongdoing, the Inspector General
at the Department of Treasury Office of Tax Administration found that "the
IRS had set up proper procedures and followed them," flatly rejecting
allegations of "inappropriate actions, such as political influence....2
Even though the Inspector General's report did not find evidence of
political strong-arming, the IRS does face a monumental task in fairly enforcing
and prosecuting offenders. To identify and prosecute every offender, the
government would, according to one author, have to monitor the "sermons,
liturgies, newsletters, literature distributions, and other communications of
those 250,000 churches [synagogues, mosques, and other houses of worship] to
constantly determine whether any prohibited political activity was being carried
on within (or outside) the church walls."'1 3 Critics are understandably opposed
to a society in which a government agency constantly monitors religious
nonprofits' activities. And yet, that fear is short-sighted, since it fails to
recognize the IRS's larger policy goals of education and deterrence. The IRS
does not need to selectively seek out churches that violate § 501(c)(3);
community members who identify abuse of their tax dollars or who feel
uncomfortable attending an overtly political religious service refer cases of
potential abuse to the agency."4  By pursuing credible allegations of
wrongdoing,"' the IRS raises awareness of the problem and educates other
organizations about how to avoid impermissible actions. The IRS neither
intends to, nor realistically can, identify and investigate every case of church
electioneering nationwide. As with all regulatory bodies, the IRS promotes
education and compliance by investigating the most prominent and egregious
§ 501(c)(3) violations. "6
110. See Albert B. Crenshaw, No Political Motives Found in IRS Probes, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,
2005, at A27.
111. Gail Perry, IRS, Charities Clashing Over Possible Political Activities, ACCOUNTING TODAY,
Apr. 3, 2006, at 3.
112. Crenshaw, supra note 110.
113. Prather, supra note 71, at 157.
114. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 2 ("PACI was a comprehensive
examination program of limited-scope examinations focusing on allegations of political campaign
intervention by IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations referred to the IRS.").
115. See id. at 3 ("The standard for determining if the information [referrals] warranted further IRS
action is whether it supports a reasonable belief that the organization may have violated the prohibition
of § 501(c)(3) that it not participate in, or intervene in (including publishing or distributing of
statements), a political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.").
116. See id. at 1 ("The objective of the project was to promote compliance with the IRC § 501(c)(3)
prohibition against political campaign intervention by reviewing and addressing allegations of political
intervention (PI) by tax exempt organizations .... This would not only deter organizations contacted
[Vol. 71:185
FROM BRANCH MINISTRIES TO SELMA
V
ANALYSIS: WHY IRS ENFORCEMENT AND THE PACI ARE DESIRABLE
A. The Perspective of Nonprofit Advocates
The IRS's recent enforcement, vis-A-vis the PACI, of the prohibition against
church electioneering achieves the dual goals of protecting nonprofits' missions
and maintaining their integrity. Then-IRS Commissioner Mark Everson
highlighted these policy concerns in his February 26, 2006, speech announcing a
revised PACI. First, "if individuals and organizations that should be taxed
masquerade as charities, over time there will be an erosion of our nation's
revenue base.." Second, "if Americans lose faith in charities because of abuses,
they will stop giving[,] and those in need will suffer.. 18 In other words, if the
public loses faith in charities, private donations to nonprofits will decrease,
rendering charities ineffective at providing the social assistance government
traditionally relies on (and that it indirectly subsidizes through tax exemptions).
Ultimately, distrust of charitable giving will increase government involvement
in social services, thus minimizing the role of community-based organizations
(including § 501(c)(3) churches) and increasing costs for taxpayers."9
To prevent distrust and, indeed, to assure Americans that churches and
other nonprofits are "above the political fray,"'20 § 501(c)(3) organizations need
clear guidance regarding the activities that may jeopardize their tax-exempt
status. From the perspective of a nonprofit advocate, then, the PACI embodies
the IRS's efforts to act transparently and to effectuate the purpose of
§ 501(c)(3). As one nonprofit trade publication points out, "[a]dvocates for
nonprofit groups praised the [2004 PACI] report, saying it was unusually clear
and straightforward."'2 ' This statement demonstrates a marked improvement
over the concerns expressed by a nonprofit expert in a 2003 letter to the editor:
"We found that the typical executive director of a § 501(c)(3) has little
understanding of what the law actually says.... The law is a patchwork of
under the program from continuing noncompliance, but also would serve to establish IRS enforcement
presence and reinforce the IRS education efforts."). But see Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes,
Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771, 776-77 (2001) (expressing concern that
"the premises of the conditional exemption scheme, the labeling it invites, and the monitoring of the
distinctions it creates will tame religion by saying what it is and identifying what it is not, tempt religion
to revise its conception of itself and of its mission, and convince religious consciousness to internalize
the state's own judgment that faith simply does not belong in politics").
117. Everson, supra note 72.
118. Id.
119. See Miller & Berger, supra note 106 ("[Pjrotection of the charitable community's image
justifies enforcement of the ban.... [I]f the public loses faith that its charities are above the political
fray charitable donations will dwindle. If this occurs, organizations may have to terminate charitable
operations that they can no longer sustain, thus increasing pressure on the government to provide
services formerly provided by the charities.").
120. Id.
121. Strom, supra note 94.
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confusing, contradictory, and unworkable provisions." '122 Overall, the IRS is
taking a crucial-and unprecedented-step toward increased compliance by
promoting understanding of prohibited activities.
Most important, the IRS has not frustrated the core purpose of nonprofit
organizations or churches by enforcing § 501(c)(3).' 3 An Arizona minister
recently expressed concern that "if we [clergy] can't speak out on issues of
injustice, that flies in the face of our whole Judeo-Christian tradition."24 In fact,
religious organizations may participate in a broad scope of permissible political
activity, including discussions of community injustice and the policies that
should generally address it. Even the leader of a prominent anti-electioneering
advocacy group agrees: "It's not illegal to talk about issues. This has nothing to
do with speaking out on moral issues. This is only about maintaining a complete
and clearly understood prohibition against candidate endorsements."'"
Churches have broad latitude' 26 in their ability to discuss salient policy issues
"ranging from abortion, gay rights[,] and gun control to poverty, civil rights[,]
and the death penalty.' '2 ' They may engage in aforementioned voter-education
activities, such as hosting candidate forums and producing voter guides, so long
as the actions do not cross the line into political intervention. Indeed, data show
that educational efforts such as distributing voter guides are among the least
likely to trigger a violation.
1 28
Alternately, a church may establish a separately incorporated § 501(c)(4)
organization12 to pursue lobbying and electoral activities that would not be
permissible under § 501(c)(3). And if that level of participation were not
sufficient, a church could always forego its tax-exempt status to engage in
unlimited partisan political activities. Regardless of a church's level of chosen
activity, preventing § 501(c)(3) organizations from impermissibly engaging in
122. Jeffrey M. Berry, Letter to the Editor, The Lobbying Law Is More Charitable Than They
Think, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at B1.
123. But see Garnett, supra note 116, at 779, 799 (asserting that tax exemption is the government's
paying churches not to talk and "[t]hat the government's assignment of its own meanings to what
churches do, and what government and law say about the place of religion in public life, threaten to
further denude the 'public square' and weaken the much-remarked structures of civil society").
124. Innes, supra note 102 (quoting Reverend David Wilkinson of Tucson's St. Francis in the
Foothills Church).
125. Keller, supra note 32 (quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State Executive
Director Reverend Barry Lynn).
126. See Hon. Timothy E. Wirth, President, United Nations Foundation, Mobilizing for Social
Change: Impacting Policy, Politics and the Legislative Agenda, Mar. 22, 2005 (on file with author)
("[T]here is a broad latitude to engage in public education efforts that promote a point of view, again
just so long as you don't engage in partisan politics.").
127. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, RELIGION, PARTISAN
POLITICS AND TAX EXEMPTION: WHAT FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES AND WHY (2006), available at
http://projectfairplay.org/brochure/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
128. See OMB WATCH, REPORT: IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM FOR
CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS, SUPPLEMENT A:
RESULTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE 2004 ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 21 (July 2006).
129. See Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143-44 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing the
advantages of a church's creating a separate § 501(c)(4) organization for lobbying purposes).
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political activity maintains, from a nonprofit perspective, the integrity and the
mission of those organizations.
B. Normative and Policy Arguments
Although IRS Commissioner Everson highlighted two of the main policy
rationales for strictly enforcing § 501(c)(3), he failed to mention two persuasive
arguments. First, American taxpayers should not be forced to indirectly
subsidize political activity antithetical to their own beliefs. Normatively, the
government has a compelling and desirable reason to enforce the ban against
church electioneering: "that of guarant[ee]ing that the wall separating church
and state remain high and firm.""'3 The idea that the federal government could
fund partisan political activity through church tax exemptions is contrary to the
very notion of church and state separation. Moreover, it would foster
divisiveness within the religious community"' by discouraging parishioners of
one political persuasion from attending services at, or contributing to, churches
that support only political ideas adverse to theirs. It would also foster
divisiveness outside the religious community by polarizing different
congregations based on perceived political persuasion. Such a result is certainly
not desirable for religious Americans, many of whom attend church-at least in
part-for a political respite.
Second, allowing churches to participate in political activities would result in
dramatic de facto campaign finance reform-enabling parishioners to make tax-
exempt donations to churches, which in turn could finance television ads,
campaign stops, and other electoral activities. Because contributions to political
campaigns are not currently tax deductible, conferring a tax deduction upon
parishioners (or even nonmembers) who make contributions to churches-
ostensibly used for political activities-would mark a serious circumvention of
campaign-finance laws."2
In addition to affecting campaign-finance laws substantially, this loophole
would negatively affect churches and other § 501(c)(3) nonprofits. If
contributors could permissibly donate money to nonprofits, expecting it to be
used for political activities, other donors might halt contributions out of fear
that their money would be used for campaigns instead of for serving the
organization's mission. Of course, the ultimate victim of this domino effect is
the beneficiary of whatever services the § 501(c)(3) previously provided.
Allowing § 501(c)(3) churches to spend money on political activities is simply
untenable.
130. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972).
131. See AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 127.
132. See id.
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VI
CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO 2008
A. Improvements in IRS Enforcement Procedures
Looking toward the 2008 election cycle, the IRS should consider
improvements to the PACI process. Although the IRS has "taken an important
and constructive step forward"'33 by creating the PACI and by educating
§ 501(c)(3) organizations, it should continue to assess the program's efficacy.
Specifically, the IRS should consider three reforms. First, it should clarify
the propriety of political activities, whose status for § 501(c)(3) purposes many
churches find confusing or ambiguous. For example, the agency should improve
guidance on what, if any, political content a § 501(c)(3) organization may post
on its website." By providing examples of permissible content and
impermissible activity, such as posting links to candidate websites, the IRS will
improve compliance and deter violations caused by good-faith confusion. In
addition, the IRS should clarify the consequences when an invited guest who is
not part of an organization's leadership makes unanticipated political
statements at an official organization event.3'
Second, the IRS should consider and pursue a new category of penalties for
church electioneering. The 2004 PACI report points out that "the existing
sanctions are limited to assessing penalties based on the amount spent on the
intervention, which is often de minimis, or revocation, which may not be in the
public interest.""' 6 Although a new penalty would require congressional
legislation, it would provide a moderate enforcement option between the
revocation of tax-exempt status and a proverbial slap on the wrist. A more
moderate option would serve as a stronger deterrent than the prospect of a
mere advisory letter and would equip the IRS with meaningful enforcement
mechanisms, since revocation of tax-exempt status is so rarely utilized.
Finally, the IRS should educate political candidates, perhaps through the
Federal Election Commission, to explain the consequences of political activity
at official § 501(c)(3) organization functions. Currently, there is a double
standard for enforcing the ban on political activity in nonprofit organizations:
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are prohibited from contributing to, or intervening in,
political campaigns, but "the law does not prohibit candidates from accepting
contributions from charitable organizations."'37 Consequently, there is a
disincentive for candidates to help churches comply with § 501(c)(3)
regulations. Moreover, because of First Amendment concerns, the government
133. See OMB WATCH, supra note 128, at 16.
134. See Miller & Berger, supra note 106.
135. See id. ("Guidance on the level of encouragement required to create control [for nonleader
political statements] would help charities understand their responsibilities in this area.").
136. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 75, at 2.
137. Perry, supra note 111.
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may not be able to regulate a candidate's acceptance of contributions from
§ 501(c)(3) organizations. As a result, the IRS should extend education efforts
to national political candidates, at the least, to prevent well-meaning candidates
from jeopardizing churches' tax-exempt status because of impermissible
political activity.
B. Selma and Beyond
To be sure, the IRS can and should improve its enforcement technique and
process. Yet the IRS has succeeded in implementing an unprecedented
enforcement program. According to one advocacy-group director, "It's no
longer possible for critics to say that the I.R.S. is blind or toothless, because this
announcement [regarding the PACI] is a pretty major indication that they are
serious about educating charities and about imposing appropriate penalties.'' 38
Even so, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama's March 4, 2007, speeches in
Selma, Alabama, suggest that political candidates will utilize church
congregations as campaign stomping grounds unless churches self-regulate or
the IRS comprehensively enforces the ban on church electioneering. It is too
early to determine if the IRS will investigate the churches that allowed Hillary
Clinton to promote her presidential candidacy and Barack Obama to criticize
the Bush Department of Justice. Regardless of the IRS's enforcement of the
churches in Selma, the agency will continue to face the constitutional tensions
that arise when churches and speech are regulated. With improved
implementation, however, the line-drawing perpetuated by the PACI may
reconcile these tensions and help § 501(c)(3) churches comply with the
conditions necessary to maintain tax-exempt status while maintaining their
integrity as nonprofit organizations.
138. Strom, supra note 94 (quoting Barry W. Lynn, executive director of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State).
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